open-coder-ai

by chock-core

Best-effort, on parsed commands (echo ignored). Blocks rm -rf on absolute, ~, $HOME, . or .. paths; recursive Remove-Item/rd/del on drive paths; git push --force or +refspec, reset --hard, clean -f, checkout .; kubectl delete; terraform destroy; aws s3 rm --recursive/rb --force; dropdb; helm uninstall; docker volume rm/prune, system prune; find -delete/-exec rm; shred; truncate; wipefs -a/-o; gcloud with any `delete` operand. branch -D asks. Pre-push hook refuses non-fast-forward pushes.

by chock-core

Best-effort, on parsed commands (echo ignored); verdicts come from the chock_destructive table shared with rtk-dangerous-actions-blocker. Blocks recursive deletes of root, home or abs paths; mv/chmod/chown -R of system dirs; dd to devices, mkfs; account lockouts; force, delete and mirror pushes; history rewrites; IaC destroy; listed cloud and platform deletes; DB drops. Asks: rm -rf off a safe list, bare lease, stash drop, -auto-approve, drain, prunes, API deletes. Pre-push: no non-ff.

by chock-core

Warns (observe rollout) when a line added to a script, Dockerfile, Makefile, CI workflow or package.json wires a download into a code runner: curl/wget/aria2c/lynx/iwr/irm piped into a shell, python/perl/ruby/node/php/lua on stdin, pwsh or iex; bash -c, eval, source or a here-string of a $(...) or <(...) download; Dockerfile ADD of a URL without --checksum. One line at a time: continuation lines, variables, unicode-escaped JSON, split or quoted command names, a download saved to a file and run on a later step, and interpreters or fetchers outside the lists are missed. Never refuses. Friction only.

by chock-core

Friction, not a security boundary: flags lines added to hook launchers and scripts that switch git hooks off -- the hook-skip option on a git commit/push/merge/am/rebase/pull, core.hooksPath set by git config or GIT_CONFIG_*, the husky, lefthook and pre-commit off-switch variables, a pre-commit, lefthook or husky (v8 and older) uninstall -- in .husky/, .githooks/, lefthook, package.json, Makefile, justfile, .envrc, *.sh. Warns only (observe). Misses: split lines, -n.

by chock-core

Blocks hidden Unicode in added lines: bidi, tag and plane-14 chars, word joiner, chained invisibles, zero-width/joiners/fillers by ASCII, mid-line BOM, LRM/RLM outside RTL text, selectors after ASCII, private-use runs of 16+. Allows emoji, RTL/Indic/Thai/CJK text, line-start BOM. Not caught: homoglyphs, a joiner between non-ASCII, binary files and text after U+2028 at commit. Runs: commit, agent write, turn's end. Waiver: 'pragma: allowlist invisible-unicode' same line; agent: HEAD only.

by chock-core

Blocks hidden Unicode in added lines: bidi, tag and plane-14 chars, word joiner, chained invisibles, zero-width/joiners/fillers by ASCII, mid-line BOM, LRM/RLM outside RTL text, selectors after ASCII, private-use runs of 16+. Allows emoji, RTL/Indic/Thai/CJK text, line-start BOM. Not caught: homoglyphs, a joiner between non-ASCII, binary files and text after U+2028 at commit. Runs: commit, agent write, turn's end. Waiver: 'pragma: allowlist invisible-unicode' same line; agent: HEAD only.

by chock-core

Best-effort guard against skipping git hooks: --no-verify on commit, push, merge, am and rebase, -n on commit and am (on push -n is --dry-run, allowed), and core.hooksPath set by -c, --config-env, `git config` or GIT_CONFIG_*. Read as parsed commands: wrappers are seen, message text is not. Also refuses an agent setting a person-only variable (CHOCK_ALLOW*, CHOCK_AGENT_COMMIT, CHOCK_DIFF_LIMIT) or hiding CLAUDECODE/AI_AGENT/CHOCK_AGENT_COMMIT; it says ask the person. Bypasses: aliases, scripts.

by chock-core

Friction, not a security boundary: refuses agent commands that skip git hooks. --no-verify on commit/push/merge/am/rebase/pull/cherry-pick/revert, -n on commit/am; core.hooksPath set by -c, git config or GIT_CONFIG_*; HUSKY=0, SKIP=, LEFTHOOK=0 and kin; hook manager uninstall; aliases and rebase --exec defined in the command. Asks on plumbing, unset hooksPath, another GIT_DIR and config files. Refuses person-only CHOCK_*/marker changes. Misses: older aliases, scripts, $VARs.

by chock-core

Best-effort guard against shell commands that publish or keep access after the session: npm/pnpm/yarn/twine/ poetry/uv/cargo/gem publish, docker/podman push and login, npm token and registry edits, repos made public; user services, launch agents, cron/at/schtasks, Run keys, authorized_keys, runner registration, sudoers, setuid bits, detached downloads. Asks on gh release create, git remote add, git push to a URL. Misses: scripts, aliases, system units, shell rc files, ssh-run commands.

by chock-core

Best-effort guard against an agent reading credentials from the shell: cat, grep, sed, cp, tar, base64, source or < on ~/.ssh (not .pub), ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc, ~/.netrc, ~/.kube, ~/.gnupg, agent CLI dirs, browser login DBs, wallets, .env (not .env.example), *.tfstate; interpreter one-liners naming them; gh auth token, aws sts get-session-token, git credential fill. Asks on env/printenv dumps. Misses: scripts, unresolved variables, xargs lists, $(...) results.

by chock-core

Blocks newly added test skips, focus markers and runner options that hide tests: pytest/unittest skips, non-strict xfail, importorskip; JS skip/only/todo/fixme, x/f prefixes; JUnit Disabled/Assume; Go Skip, Short(); Rust ignore; RSpec, PHPUnit, C#, Swift skips; --deselect/-k not, collect_ignore, jest testPathIgnorePatterns. Runs: commit, agent write, turn's end; only additions judged. Friction: computed names evade it. Waiver: 'chock: allow test-skip' same line; agent: only if in HEAD.

by chock-core

Best-effort guard on the tool channel: curl, wget or iwr/irm (Invoke-WebRequest/RestMethod) that UPLOADS (POST/PUT/PATCH, -d/--data*/--json, -F/--form, -T/--upload-file, wget --post-*/--body-*, -Body/-InFile/-Form) to a host outside the allowlist (registries, code hosts, localhost; exact or .suffix match). Fetch-only passes; curl -K/--config is refused. No pragma bypass: ask a person. A floor, not a sandbox: ~/.curlrc, obfuscation, other clients, runtimes.

by chock-core

Best-effort guard on the tool channel: blocks sending data to a host outside the allowlist (.chock/egress-allowlist.txt, else a built-in registry list): curl/wget/iwr uploads, nc/socat/telnet, scp/rsync/sftp, ssh commands, aws/gsutil/az uploads, git push|remote add URLs, $(..)/$VAR in a URL or host. Asks on interpreter HTTP one-liners, gh gist/--body-file, curl --proxy/--resolve/Host:. Blocks ~/.curlrc writes. A floor, not a sandbox: other clients, runtimes, obfuscation.

by chock-core

Best-effort guard against launching a coding agent with safety checks off: claude --dangerously-skip-permissions, bypassPermissions or a wildcard --allowedTools; codex --full-auto, --yolo, --ask-for-approval never, danger-full-access; gemini --yolo or --approval-mode yolo; cursor-agent --force; aider --yes-always; copilot --allow-all-tools; amp, cline, goose, opencode auto-approve. Looks through cd, bash -c, sudo, env, npx, uvx. Misses: config, aliases, scripts, ssh.

by chock-core

Gate for the line-visible slice of ASI04: agent components fetched at a floating version. Blocks dist-tags (latest, next, canary, beta, rc, nightly) on npx/uvx/bunx, dlx, add/install and pipx run; FROM at latest or an untagged registry path; floating docker run/pull and docker:// refs; pip --pre; go install at latest; unversioned cargo installs; git+ installs and requirements, and github: dependencies, with no commit SHA. Per line: friction, not a boundary (limits in references).

by chock-core

Commit and agent-write gate, greppable slice of ASI05: bare, global-receiver and indirect eval/exec forms, the Function constructor, string timers, exec-mode compile, import by computed name, shell-mode and implicit-shell process APIs, unsafe deserializers (pickle family, unsafe yaml loaders, model loads) and shell eval of a variable. File-type-blind line scan: friction, not a security boundary. Waiver 'pragma: allowlist exec' on the line; in the agent only if already committed in HEAD.

by chock-core

Blocks agent grants that allow everything: a bare Bash wildcard, a `*` in an allow/alwaysAllow/tools array on the same line, or quoted defaultMode bypassPermissions. Any file is judged. Not caught: a multi-line array (`"*"` alone on a line, YAML `- "*"` list), unquoted defaultMode: bypassPermissions. Runs: commit, agent write, turn's end. Waiver: 'pragma: allowlist broad-agency' same line. Person's commit: honoured. Agent: only if already in HEAD; MCP gateway: never. Agent asks a person.

by chock-core

Blocks agent grants that allow everything: a bare Bash wildcard, a `*` in an allow/alwaysAllow/tools array on the same line, or quoted defaultMode bypassPermissions. Any file is judged. Not caught here: a multi-line array or YAML `- "*"` list, an unquoted defaultMode (agent-permissions-scan warns). Runs: commit, agent write, turn's end. Waiver: 'pragma: allowlist broad-agency' same line. Person's commit: honoured. Agent: only if already in HEAD; MCP gateway: never. Agent asks a person.

by chock-core

Pre-commit gate for the mechanizable slice of ASI03, one line at a time: a wildcard action, resource or principal in string or list form, any quote style (JSON, YAML, Terraform, CDK, escaped JSON), whole-service wildcards on s3, iam, sts, kms and ec2 actions, Allow with an inverted key, administrator, power-user and IAM-admin managed policies, GCP owner and editor roles and public members, Kubernetes RBAC wildcards and cluster-admin, Azure wildcard actions and Owner. Only a one-line strict-JSON AWS Deny statement is exempt. Friction, not a security boundary: grants split across lines (iam-policy-scan reads those), partial wildcards, unlisted services and roles, YAML aliases or tags and runtime-built grants pass; other Deny forms and admission-webhook wildcards are refused. Escape: 'pragma: allowlist broad-privilege' on the same line, honoured at commit; at agent tool-use only when that exact line is already committed in HEAD.

by chock-core

trigger: personalize the coding agent to its owner -- adopt the owner's dialect, taste, habits and demeanor so it works like a trained twin of that developer. apply: the owner's chock-mise profile where present; defer to committed project standards where it is silent or conflicts. avoid: inferring personal identity or employer-confidential data, and overriding the project's own committed rules.

by chock-core

Friction, not a security boundary: warns (observe) on GitHub Actions weaknesses a change adds to workflows, composite actions and dependabot.yml: event text in run/script, PR-head checkout under pull_request_target/workflow_run/issue_comment, missing or write-all permissions, secrets inherit or inlined, self-hosted runners on PRs, GITHUB_ENV writes, artifact and cache poisoning, agent steps on untrusted text. Misses: step outputs, composite internals, custom runner labels.

by chock-core

trigger: secrets, eval/exec, unsanitized SQL, hallucinated dependencies. avoid: committing credentials, adding unverified packages, executing dynamic code. Install scan-secrets (commit, agent write) for secrets and verify-dependency-exists (opt-in; needs an allowlist) for dependencies. Advisory: eval/exec and SQL guidance; a gate decides only the non-literal slice (agentic-code-security code pack: Python eval/exec, SQL built from strings in Python and JS).

by chock-core

trigger: secrets, eval/exec, unsanitized SQL, hallucinated dependencies. avoid: committing credentials, adding unverified packages, executing dynamic code. Install scan-secrets (commit, agent write) for secrets and verify-dependency-exists (opt-in; needs an allowlist) for dependencies. Advisory: eval/exec and SQL guidance; a gate decides only the non-literal slice (agentic-code-security code pack: Python eval/exec, SQL built from strings in Python and JS).

by chock-core

Blocks adding a known-malicious package version (npm, PyPI, crates, Go, RubyGems, Packagist manifests and lockfiles), a re-pointed action ref, or an IOC file name, from a dated, sourced list (data/ioc.json, CI fails 120 days after as_of). Runs: commit, agent write, turn's end; only additions judged. Exact versions only: a range is not resolved. A snapshot, not a feed; friction, not a boundary. Adopt under rollout observe.