ci-github-actions-security

v0.0.1

Friction, not a security boundary: warns (observe) on GitHub Actions weaknesses a change adds to workflows, composite actions and dependabot.yml: event text in run/script, PR-head checkout under pull_request_target/workflow_run/issue_comment, missing or write-all permissions, secrets inherit or inlined, self-hosted runners on PRs, GITHUB_ENV writes, artifact and cache poisoning, agent steps on untrusted text. Misses: step outputs, composite internals, custom runner labels.

Agent Plugins1 Skill

By chock-coreLicense: Apache-2.03 GitHub starsUpdated 2 hours ago

Directory evidence

Runtimes: Agent Plugins
Parsed components: 1 skill or MCP entry
Source updated: Oct 4, 2026
Manifest status: Canonical path parsed

The directory validates manifest shape and source location. It does not execute the plugin or provide a security endorsement. Review the indexing methodology →

Get the plugin

$ git clone https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock-catalog

Clone the source repository, then follow its setup instructions to add the plugin to a compatible client. The plugin root is base/ci-github-actions-security/.

This listing currently publishes only the generic Agent Plugins format. Automatic install commands for other clients are not generated yet.

Plugin files

base/ci-github-actions-security/

├── plugin.json
└── skills/ci-github-actions-security/SKILL.md

Included Skills1

ci-github-actions-securityskills/ci-github-actions-security/SKILL.md

Plugin manifests1

base/ci-github-actions-security/plugin.json

{
  "$schema": "https://agent-plugins.org/schemas/1.0.0/plugin.schema.json",
  "name": "ci-github-actions-security",
  "version": "0.0.1",
  "description": "Friction, not a security boundary: warns (observe) on GitHub Actions weaknesses a change adds to workflows, composite actions and dependabot.yml: event text in run/script, PR-head checkout under pull_request_target/workflow_run/issue_comment, missing or write-all permissions, secrets inherit or inlined, self-hosted runners on PRs, GITHUB_ENV writes, artifact and cache poisoning, agent steps on untrusted text. Misses: step outputs, composite internals, custom runner labels.",
  "author": {
    "name": "chock-core"
  },
  "repository": "https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock-catalog",
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "keywords": [
    "chock",
    "policy-as-code",
    "hook",
    "advise"
  ],
  "extensions": {
    "io.github.open-coder-ai": {
      "manifest": "manifest.yaml",
      "artifact": "hook",
      "enforcement": "advise",
      "coverage_without_chock": "advisory"
    }
  }
}

Browse the “chock” tag →

agent-discipline

by chock-core

trigger: edits without reading, unverified completion claims, weakened tests, dead code. avoid: skipping verification, deleting assertions, leaving unused code.

Agent Plugins1 Skill

8Updated yesterday

block-destructive-commands

by chock-core

Best-effort guard against destructive commands, read as parsed commands (bash -c and cd chains included, echo excluded): rm -rf on absolute, home ($HOME/~) or root-adjacent paths (and PowerShell Remove-Item -Recurse); git push --force (not --force-with-lease), reset --hard, clean -f; kubectl delete; terraform destroy; aws s3 rm --recursive / rb --force; dropdb; helm uninstall/delete; docker volume rm/prune and system prune; gcloud ... delete; find -delete / -exec rm; shred; truncate; wipefs -a. git branch -D asks first. Verbs are matched position-aware, so a bucket or object NAMED like a verb is allowed, and a relative path in the working tree stays allowed. sudo, doas and pkexec are transparent. A pre-push hook refuses any non-fast-forward push -- force, +refspec or lease alike; a human escapes with git push --no-verify. Known bypasses: aliases, an unusual value-flag, interpreters and scripts. Friction, not a security boundary.

Agent Plugins1 Skill

8Updated yesterday

block-invisible-unicode

by chock-core

The mechanizable slice of prompt-injection defense, enforced at two points: at commit (the git hook, over staged changes) and at agent tool-use (over a tool call's arguments, as the agent writes) -- invisible and direction-override Unicode. Bidi controls make code read differently than it parses (Trojan Source, CVE-2021-42574); Unicode tag-block characters smuggle instructions that are invisible to a human reviewer but fully legible to the agent reading the file. Zero-width joiners and bidi marks (ZWJ/ZWNJ/LRM/RLM) are deliberately NOT matched -- they are legitimate in emoji sequences and in Persian, Arabic and Indic text -- so ordinary internationalised content passes; only the override/embed/isolate controls and the tag block, which have no honest use in a source tree, are blocked. Escape: 'pragma: allowlist invisible-unicode' on the same line.

Agent Plugins1 Skill

8Updated yesterday

For maintainers

If you maintain this plugin, link to this source-backed listing from your README so users can review its manifest and indexed components.

[ci-github-actions-security on Agent Plugins Marketplace](https://pluginsmp.com/plugins/ci-github-actions-security)

Directory evidence

Get the plugin

Plugin files

Included Skills1

Plugin manifests1

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For maintainers

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