rtk-dangerous-actions-blocker
v0.1.0Carved out for rtk-ai/rtk#1007: rtk's own decision table as a chock policy (rtk's own hooks may not block). Refuses rm -rf on root, home, parent or absolute paths; git push --force and '+' refspecs (not --force-with-lease); reads of credential files (.env, *.pem, *.key, id_rsa, ~/.ssh, ~/.aws) by cat, grep, rg, awk, sed, jq and the like or by `< file`, and echoes or inline literals of *_API_KEY/*_SECRET/*_TOKEN; DROP/TRUNCATE/unscoped DELETE through psql, mysql, sqlite3, mongosh, redis-cli, and dropdb; plus the base policy's cloud rows (kubectl delete, terraform destroy, aws s3 rm --recursive, helm uninstall, gcloud delete, docker volume rm). Asks where rtk's table says ask: rm -rf on a relative path off the safe list; git reset --hard, clean -f, checkout ., branch -D; docker prune and docker rm -f over a substitution. File checks are skipped inside docker/kubectl exec; rtk is a transparent prefix. Friction, not a security boundary. [Session-enforced by the PreToolUse hook under com.github.copilot/ in clients that read that namespace (documented for VS Code agent mode); a client that ignores it, as the Agent Plugins spec tells generic clients to, gets the advisory skill only. The hook needs git, a usable bash and a Python 3.11+ (python3, python or py, whichever actually runs). With no working Python it exits 2; without git or bash, fail-open clients allow silently and fail-closed clients refuse matched commands. If the guard itself crashes or times out, the hook asks for confirmation rather than allowing silently -- VS Code agent mode honours that ask and it overrides the client's own auto-approve.]
By chock-coreLicense: Apache-2.02 GitHub starsUpdated 6 days ago
Directory evidence
- Runtimes
- Agent Plugins
- Parsed components
- 1 skill or MCP entry
- Source updated
- Sep 30, 2026
- Manifest status
- Canonical path parsed
The directory validates manifest shape and source location. It does not execute the plugin or provide a security endorsement. Review the indexing methodology →
Get the plugin
git clone https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock-copilot-pluginsClone the source repository, then follow its setup instructions to add the plugin to a compatible client. The plugin root is copilot/rtk-dangerous-actions-blocker/.
This listing currently publishes only the generic Agent Plugins format. Automatic install commands for other clients are not generated yet.
Plugin files
├── plugin.json└── skills/rtk-dangerous-actions-blocker/SKILL.md
Included Skills1
Carved out for rtk-ai/rtk#1007: rtk's own decision table as a chock policy (rtk's own hooks may not block). Refuses rm -rf on root, home, parent or absolute paths; git push --force and '+' refspecs (not --force-with-lease); reads of credential files (.env, *.pem, *.key, id_rsa, ~/.ssh, ~/.aws) by cat, grep, rg, awk, sed, jq and the like or by `< file`, and echoes or inline literals of *_API_KEY/*_SECRET/*_TOKEN; DROP/TRUNCATE/unscoped DELETE through psql, mysql, sqlite3, mongosh, redis-cli, and dropdb; plus the base policy's cloud rows (kubectl delete, terraform destroy, aws s3 rm --recursive, helm uninstall, gcloud delete, docker volume rm). Asks where rtk's table says ask: rm -rf on a relative path off the safe list; git reset --hard, clean -f, checkout ., branch -D; docker prune and docker rm -f over a substitution. File checks are skipped inside docker/kubectl exec; rtk is a transparent prefix. Friction, not a security boundary.
Plugin manifests1
{
"$schema": "https://agent-plugins.org/schemas/1.0.0/plugin.schema.json",
"name": "rtk-dangerous-actions-blocker",
"version": "0.1.0",
"description": "Carved out for rtk-ai/rtk#1007: rtk's own decision table as a chock policy (rtk's own hooks may not block). Refuses rm -rf on root, home, parent or absolute paths; git push --force and '+' refspecs (not --force-with-lease); reads of credential files (.env, *.pem, *.key, id_rsa, ~/.ssh, ~/.aws) by cat, grep, rg, awk, sed, jq and the like or by `< file`, and echoes or inline literals of *_API_KEY/*_SECRET/*_TOKEN; DROP/TRUNCATE/unscoped DELETE through psql, mysql, sqlite3, mongosh, redis-cli, and dropdb; plus the base policy's cloud rows (kubectl delete, terraform destroy, aws s3 rm --recursive, helm uninstall, gcloud delete, docker volume rm). Asks where rtk's table says ask: rm -rf on a relative path off the safe list; git reset --hard, clean -f, checkout ., branch -D; docker prune and docker rm -f over a substitution. File checks are skipped inside docker/kubectl exec; rtk is a transparent prefix. Friction, not a security boundary. [Session-enforced by the PreToolUse hook under com.github.copilot/ in clients that read that namespace (documented for VS Code agent mode); a client that ignores it, as the Agent Plugins spec tells generic clients to, gets the advisory skill only. The hook needs git, a usable bash and a Python 3.11+ (python3, python or py, whichever actually runs). With no working Python it exits 2; without git or bash, fail-open clients allow silently and fail-closed clients refuse matched commands. If the guard itself crashes or times out, the hook asks for confirmation rather than allowing silently -- VS Code agent mode honours that ask and it overrides the client's own auto-approve.]",
"author": {
"name": "chock-core"
},
"repository": "https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock-catalog",
"license": "Apache-2.0",
"keywords": [
"chock",
"policy-as-code",
"rule",
"advise",
"asi02"
],
"extensions": {
"io.github.open-coder-ai": {
"artifact": "rule",
"enforcement": "advise",
"hooks": "com.github.copilot/hooks/hooks.json"
}
}
}For maintainers
If you maintain this plugin, link to this source-backed listing from your README so users can review its manifest and indexed components.
[rtk-dangerous-actions-blocker on Agent Plugins Marketplace](https://pluginsmp.com/plugins/rtk-dangerous-actions-blocker-5)