Agent Plugins Marketplace
← All plugins

rtk-dangerous-actions-blocker

v0.1.0

Carved out for rtk-ai/rtk#1007: rtk's own decision table as a chock policy (rtk's own hooks may not block). Refuses rm -rf on root, home, parent or absolute paths; git push --force and '+' refspecs (not --force-with-lease); reads of credential files (.env, *.pem, *.key, id_rsa, ~/.ssh, ~/.aws) by cat, grep, rg, awk, sed, jq and the like or by `< file`, and echoes or inline literals of *_API_KEY/*_SECRET/*_TOKEN; DROP/TRUNCATE/unscoped DELETE through psql, mysql, sqlite3, mongosh, redis-cli, and dropdb; plus the base policy's cloud rows (kubectl delete, terraform destroy, aws s3 rm --recursive, helm uninstall, gcloud delete, docker volume rm). Asks where rtk's table says ask: rm -rf on a relative path off the safe list; git reset --hard, clean -f, checkout ., branch -D; docker prune and docker rm -f over a substitution. File checks are skipped inside docker/kubectl exec; rtk is a transparent prefix. Friction, not a security boundary. [Session-enforced via a PreToolUse hook; needs git, a usable bash and a Python 3.11+ (python3, python or py, whichever actually runs; the Windows Store stub is skipped). With no working Python the hook refuses (exit 2); without git or bash, fail-open clients allow silently and fail-closed clients refuse matched commands. If the guard itself crashes or times out, the hook asks for confirmation rather than allowing silently.]

Claude Code1 Skill

By chock-coreLicense: Apache-2.02 GitHub starsUpdated 6 days ago

Directory evidence

Runtimes
Claude Code
Parsed components
1 skill or MCP entry
Source updated
Sep 30, 2026
Manifest status
Canonical path parsed

The directory validates manifest shape and source location. It does not execute the plugin or provide a security endorsement. Review the indexing methodology →

Install rtk-dangerous-actions-blocker for Claude Code

Installs for the current user
claude plugin marketplace add IchenDEV/agent-plugin-mkt
claude plugin marketplace update agent-plugin-marketplace
claude plugin install rtk-dangerous-actions-blocker-4@agent-plugin-marketplace

Paste and run these commands in a terminal with Claude Code. They add and refresh the PluginsMP catalog, then install this plugin.

The installer fetches third-party code from the source repository shown on this page. This directory validates manifest structure and source location, but does not perform a security audit; review the manifest, components, and source before installing.

Get the source manually
git clone https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock-copilot-plugins

Clone the source repository, then follow its setup instructions to add the plugin to a compatible client. The plugin root is claude/rtk-dangerous-actions-blocker/.

Plugin files

claude/rtk-dangerous-actions-blocker/
├── .claude-plugin/plugin.json
└── skills/rtk-dangerous-actions-blocker/SKILL.md

Included Skills1

rtk-dangerous-actions-blockerskills/rtk-dangerous-actions-blocker/SKILL.md

Carved out for rtk-ai/rtk#1007: rtk's own decision table as a chock policy (rtk's own hooks may not block). Refuses rm -rf on root, home, parent or absolute paths; git push --force and '+' refspecs (not --force-with-lease); reads of credential files (.env, *.pem, *.key, id_rsa, ~/.ssh, ~/.aws) by cat, grep, rg, awk, sed, jq and the like or by `< file`, and echoes or inline literals of *_API_KEY/*_SECRET/*_TOKEN; DROP/TRUNCATE/unscoped DELETE through psql, mysql, sqlite3, mongosh, redis-cli, and dropdb; plus the base policy's cloud rows (kubectl delete, terraform destroy, aws s3 rm --recursive, helm uninstall, gcloud delete, docker volume rm). Asks where rtk's table says ask: rm -rf on a relative path off the safe list; git reset --hard, clean -f, checkout ., branch -D; docker prune and docker rm -f over a substitution. File checks are skipped inside docker/kubectl exec; rtk is a transparent prefix. Friction, not a security boundary.

Plugin manifests1

claude/rtk-dangerous-actions-blocker/.claude-plugin/plugin.json
{
  "name": "rtk-dangerous-actions-blocker",
  "description": "Carved out for rtk-ai/rtk#1007: rtk's own decision table as a chock policy (rtk's own hooks may not block). Refuses rm -rf on root, home, parent or absolute paths; git push --force and '+' refspecs (not --force-with-lease); reads of credential files (.env, *.pem, *.key, id_rsa, ~/.ssh, ~/.aws) by cat, grep, rg, awk, sed, jq and the like or by `< file`, and echoes or inline literals of *_API_KEY/*_SECRET/*_TOKEN; DROP/TRUNCATE/unscoped DELETE through psql, mysql, sqlite3, mongosh, redis-cli, and dropdb; plus the base policy's cloud rows (kubectl delete, terraform destroy, aws s3 rm --recursive, helm uninstall, gcloud delete, docker volume rm). Asks where rtk's table says ask: rm -rf on a relative path off the safe list; git reset --hard, clean -f, checkout ., branch -D; docker prune and docker rm -f over a substitution. File checks are skipped inside docker/kubectl exec; rtk is a transparent prefix. Friction, not a security boundary. [Session-enforced via a PreToolUse hook; needs git, a usable bash and a Python 3.11+ (python3, python or py, whichever actually runs; the Windows Store stub is skipped). With no working Python the hook refuses (exit 2); without git or bash, fail-open clients allow silently and fail-closed clients refuse matched commands. If the guard itself crashes or times out, the hook asks for confirmation rather than allowing silently.]",
  "keywords": [
    "chock",
    "policy-as-code",
    "rule",
    "advise",
    "asi02"
  ],
  "version": "0.1.0",
  "author": {
    "name": "chock-core"
  },
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "repository": "https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock-catalog"
}

For maintainers

If you maintain this plugin, link to this source-backed listing from your README so users can review its manifest and indexed components.

[rtk-dangerous-actions-blocker on Agent Plugins Marketplace](https://pluginsmp.com/plugins/rtk-dangerous-actions-blocker-4)