protect-agent-config
v0.2.0Guard against an agent hand-editing its own guardrails. Agent instruction files (AGENTS.md and the per-agent wrappers), permission files (.claude/settings.json, .mcp.json), the dependency allowlist (.chock/dependency-allowlist.txt) and vendored enforcement (.chock/bin/, .chock/compiled/) define what the agent may do -- so a shell command that rewrites them is the agent modifying its own authority (MITRE ATLAS AML.T0081). The guard refuses shell writes to those paths -- a redirect, rm/mv/tee/sed -i, cp into the path, git checkout/restore, PowerShell Set-Content/Add-Content/Out-File; reads and copies out pass, and `chock sync` passes. Best-effort and deliberately coarse. The 'chock: approved-config-change' marker is friction plus an audit trail, not authentication. A second, tool_use-only gate refuses Edit/Write to the same paths; it never runs at commit, so a person stays free to edit them. [Session-enforced in Codex by a PreToolUse hook: a matched command is denied before it runs (witnessed blocking on Codex Desktop, Windows, 2026-08-24; the deny is returned as hook JSON, not an exit code, which Codex's Windows shell wrapper mangles). Codex requires a one-time trust review per hook -- the plugin is ADVISORY until you approve its hook, and a plugin update voids that trust until re-approved. The hook needs git and a Python 3.11+ (python3, python or py) on PATH; with no working Python it exits 2 rather than allowing, and any other failure of the HOOK (missing git, a timeout, an unexpected exit) fails OPEN. A failure of the GUARD it runs is a DENY here, because Codex rejects the confirmation prompt the other clients get. Repo-wide enforcement at commit time and in CI still needs `chock sync`.]
By chock-coreLicense: Apache-2.00 GitHub starsUpdated 6 days ago
Directory evidence
- Runtimes
- Codex
- Parsed components
- 1 skill or MCP entry
- Source updated
- Sep 30, 2026
- Manifest status
- Canonical path parsed
The directory validates manifest shape and source location. It does not execute the plugin or provide a security endorsement. Review the indexing methodology →
Install protect-agent-config for Codex
codex plugin marketplace add IchenDEV/agent-plugin-mkt
codex plugin marketplace upgrade agent-plugin-marketplace
codex plugin add protect-agent-config@agent-plugin-marketplacePaste and run these commands in a terminal with Codex. They add and refresh the PluginsMP catalog, then install this plugin.
Compatibility: the page URL and API slug “protect-agent-config-4” remain stable.
- Codex:
protect-agent-config-4@agent-plugin-marketplace→protect-agent-config@agent-plugin-marketplace
The installer fetches third-party code from the source repository shown on this page. This directory validates manifest structure and source location, but does not perform a security audit; review the manifest, components, and source before installing.
Get the source manually
git clone https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock-codex-pluginsClone the source repository, then follow its setup instructions to add the plugin to a compatible client. The plugin root is codex/protect-agent-config/.
Plugin files
├── .codex-plugin/plugin.json└── skills/protect-agent-config/SKILL.md
Included Skills1
Guard against an agent hand-editing its own guardrails. Agent instruction files (AGENTS.md and the per-agent wrappers), permission files (.claude/settings.json, .mcp.json), the dependency allowlist (.chock/dependency-allowlist.txt) and vendored enforcement (.chock/bin/, .chock/compiled/) define what the agent may do -- so a shell command that rewrites them is the agent modifying its own authority (MITRE ATLAS AML.T0081). The guard refuses shell writes to those paths -- a redirect, rm/mv/tee/sed -i, cp into the path, git checkout/restore, PowerShell Set-Content/Add-Content/Out-File; reads and copies out pass, and `chock sync` passes. Best-effort and deliberately coarse. The 'chock: approved-config-change' marker is friction plus an audit trail, not authentication. A second, tool_use-only gate refuses Edit/Write to the same paths; it never runs at commit, so a person stays free to edit them.
Plugin manifests1
{
"name": "protect-agent-config",
"version": "0.2.0",
"description": "Guard against an agent hand-editing its own guardrails. Agent instruction files (AGENTS.md and the per-agent wrappers), permission files (.claude/settings.json, .mcp.json), the dependency allowlist (.chock/dependency-allowlist.txt) and vendored enforcement (.chock/bin/, .chock/compiled/) define what the agent may do -- so a shell command that rewrites them is the agent modifying its own authority (MITRE ATLAS AML.T0081). The guard refuses shell writes to those paths -- a redirect, rm/mv/tee/sed -i, cp into the path, git checkout/restore, PowerShell Set-Content/Add-Content/Out-File; reads and copies out pass, and `chock sync` passes. Best-effort and deliberately coarse. The 'chock: approved-config-change' marker is friction plus an audit trail, not authentication. A second, tool_use-only gate refuses Edit/Write to the same paths; it never runs at commit, so a person stays free to edit them. [Session-enforced in Codex by a PreToolUse hook: a matched command is denied before it runs (witnessed blocking on Codex Desktop, Windows, 2026-08-24; the deny is returned as hook JSON, not an exit code, which Codex's Windows shell wrapper mangles). Codex requires a one-time trust review per hook -- the plugin is ADVISORY until you approve its hook, and a plugin update voids that trust until re-approved. The hook needs git and a Python 3.11+ (python3, python or py) on PATH; with no working Python it exits 2 rather than allowing, and any other failure of the HOOK (missing git, a timeout, an unexpected exit) fails OPEN. A failure of the GUARD it runs is a DENY here, because Codex rejects the confirmation prompt the other clients get. Repo-wide enforcement at commit time and in CI still needs `chock sync`.]",
"author": {
"name": "chock-core"
},
"repository": "https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock-catalog",
"license": "Apache-2.0",
"keywords": [
"chock",
"policy-as-code",
"rule",
"advise",
"{'control': 'asi03', 'coverage': 'partial', 'note': 'blocks shell self-modification of agent permission and instruction files; identity design and grant scoping remain advisory'}"
],
"interface": {
"displayName": "Protect Agent Config",
"shortDescription": "Guard against an agent hand-editing its own guardrails.",
"composerIcon": "./assets/icon.svg"
},
"skills": "./skills",
"hooks": "./hooks/hooks.json"
}For maintainers
If you maintain this plugin, link to this source-backed listing from your README so users can review its manifest and indexed components.
[protect-agent-config on Agent Plugins Marketplace](https://pluginsmp.com/plugins/protect-agent-config-4)