privacy-opsec-suite

Use when you need to verify sessions are truly unlinkable. Owns linkability/session identity — not network egress or file metadata.

Use when you need the keystone anonymity threat model that the other privacy audits build on.

Use when a commit, PR, or branch must carry no AI/tooling trace before publishing.

Use when you need to reduce the fingerprinting/uniqueness surface that could re-link anonymous users. Owns identity-fingerprint distinctiveness — NOT traffic timing/size (see traffic-analysis-resistance).

Use when you want the whole privacy-opsec-suite run end-to-end as a guided, checkpointed pipeline. Intra-plugin orchestrator.

Use when an anonymity/privacy leak is suspected and you need to triage, contain, scope blast radius, and plan remediation without making it worse.

Use when you need to find PII/identifiers leaking in logs, telemetry, errors, response headers, or embedded file metadata. Owns at-rest/in-band metadata — NOT timing/size side channels (see traffic-analysis-resistance).

Use when a LEAK_REGISTER.md exists and you want its leaks fixed safely, each pinned with a regression test. Requires a register as input.

Use when you want a pre-merge gate that blocks any change adding egress, logging, identifiers, fingerprint surface, correlation, or weakened anonymity defaults. The anonymity counterpart to code-ops-suite:pr-review and rigor:deep-review.

Use when privacy promises, the threat model, or opsec runbooks have drifted from code and you want them reconciled into the SSOT.

Use when you want high-value privacy/trust features found and specified, each gated against the anonymity model. Discovery/spec only.

Use when you need to vet dependencies for telemetry/phone-home/egress, CVEs, and build/lockfile integrity under an anonymity-hostile model.

Use when you need to prove no traffic escapes the proxy/Tor. Owns network egress + routing.

Use when you need to reduce observable timing/size/volume side channels and add padding/batching defaults. Owns traffic-shape correlation — NOT header/TLS fingerprints (see fingerprint-resistance).