owasp-asi02-tool-misuse

v0.0.2

Constrain what an agent's legitimate tools can be made to do. Grant least agency per task, validate tool parameters at the runtime boundary, authorise every invocation rather than only the first, and distrust tool metadata from unverified registries. Use when defining tool schemas, wiring an MCP server, granting shell or cloud-CLI access, or reviewing a tool-calling loop. Do NOT use for the credentials the tool authenticates with — that is `owasp-asi03-identity-privilege-abuse`.

Agent Plugins1 Skill

By chock-coreLicense: Apache-2.03 GitHub starsUpdated 2 hours ago

Directory evidence

Runtimes: Agent Plugins
Parsed components: 1 skill or MCP entry
Source updated: Oct 4, 2026
Manifest status: Canonical path parsed

The directory validates manifest shape and source location. It does not execute the plugin or provide a security endorsement. Review the indexing methodology →

Get the plugin

$ git clone https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock-catalog

Clone the source repository, then follow its setup instructions to add the plugin to a compatible client. The plugin root is agentic-security/owasp-asi02-tool-misuse/.

This listing currently publishes only the generic Agent Plugins format. Automatic install commands for other clients are not generated yet.

Plugin files

agentic-security/owasp-asi02-tool-misuse/

├── plugin.json
└── skills/owasp-asi02-tool-misuse/SKILL.md

Included Skills1

owasp-asi02-tool-misuseskills/owasp-asi02-tool-misuse/SKILL.md

Plugin manifests1

agentic-security/owasp-asi02-tool-misuse/plugin.json

{
  "$schema": "https://agent-plugins.org/schemas/1.0.0/plugin.schema.json",
  "name": "owasp-asi02-tool-misuse",
  "version": "0.0.2",
  "description": "Constrain what an agent's legitimate tools can be made to do. Grant least agency per task, validate tool parameters at the runtime boundary, authorise every invocation rather than only the first, and distrust tool metadata from unverified registries. Use when defining tool schemas, wiring an MCP server, granting shell or cloud-CLI access, or reviewing a tool-calling loop. Do NOT use for the credentials the tool authenticates with — that is `owasp-asi03-identity-privilege-abuse`.",
  "author": {
    "name": "chock-core"
  },
  "repository": "https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock-catalog",
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "keywords": [
    "chock",
    "policy-as-code",
    "rule",
    "advise",
    "asi02"
  ],
  "extensions": {
    "io.github.open-coder-ai": {
      "manifest": "manifest.yaml",
      "artifact": "rule",
      "enforcement": "advise",
      "coverage_without_chock": "advisory"
    }
  }
}

Browse the “chock” tag →

agent-discipline

by chock-core

trigger: edits without reading, unverified completion claims, weakened tests, dead code. avoid: skipping verification, deleting assertions, leaving unused code.

Agent Plugins1 Skill

8Updated yesterday

block-destructive-commands

by chock-core

Best-effort guard against destructive commands, read as parsed commands (bash -c and cd chains included, echo excluded): rm -rf on absolute, home ($HOME/~) or root-adjacent paths (and PowerShell Remove-Item -Recurse); git push --force (not --force-with-lease), reset --hard, clean -f; kubectl delete; terraform destroy; aws s3 rm --recursive / rb --force; dropdb; helm uninstall/delete; docker volume rm/prune and system prune; gcloud ... delete; find -delete / -exec rm; shred; truncate; wipefs -a. git branch -D asks first. Verbs are matched position-aware, so a bucket or object NAMED like a verb is allowed, and a relative path in the working tree stays allowed. sudo, doas and pkexec are transparent. A pre-push hook refuses any non-fast-forward push -- force, +refspec or lease alike; a human escapes with git push --no-verify. Known bypasses: aliases, an unusual value-flag, interpreters and scripts. Friction, not a security boundary.

Agent Plugins1 Skill

8Updated yesterday

block-invisible-unicode

by chock-core

The mechanizable slice of prompt-injection defense, enforced at two points: at commit (the git hook, over staged changes) and at agent tool-use (over a tool call's arguments, as the agent writes) -- invisible and direction-override Unicode. Bidi controls make code read differently than it parses (Trojan Source, CVE-2021-42574); Unicode tag-block characters smuggle instructions that are invisible to a human reviewer but fully legible to the agent reading the file. Zero-width joiners and bidi marks (ZWJ/ZWNJ/LRM/RLM) are deliberately NOT matched -- they are legitimate in emoji sequences and in Persian, Arabic and Indic text -- so ordinary internationalised content passes; only the override/embed/isolate controls and the tag block, which have no honest use in a source tree, are blocked. Escape: 'pragma: allowlist invisible-unicode' on the same line.

Agent Plugins1 Skill

8Updated yesterday

For maintainers

If you maintain this plugin, link to this source-backed listing from your README so users can review its manifest and indexed components.

[owasp-asi02-tool-misuse on Agent Plugins Marketplace](https://pluginsmp.com/plugins/owasp-asi02-tool-misuse)

Directory evidence

Get the plugin

Plugin files

Included Skills1

Plugin manifests1

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