guard-memory-writes

v0.0.4

Refuses agent-memory writes that hold what memory must never hold: pasted git history (diff headers, hunk headers, commit and index lines), a fenced code block longer than 20 lines, a line that duplicates another, and secrets (scan-secrets' pattern). Judges only memory files -- MEMORY.md at any depth, CLAUDE.local.md, .claude/memory/**, memory/**/*.md, and at agent tool-use the agent's own stores outside the repository (~/.claude/projects/*/memory/**, ~/.claude/CLAUDE.md, /memories/**) -- and only what the change adds. No waiver exists. Mechanised slice of memory-discipline's never_persist and chock-mise's never(store): secrets. Structural checks only. [Session-enforced via PreToolUse and Stop hooks; needs git and a Python 3.11+. PreToolUse judges the file a tool call would write; Stop re-reads what the turn actually left on disk, so a file written through a shell heredoc is judged too. With no working Python the hook exits 2; without git, fail-open clients allow silently. A gate that cannot reach a decision refuses rather than allowing one it never judged. Enforcement at every commit and in CI still needs chock installed in the repo. Codex requires a one-time trust review per hook -- the plugin is ADVISORY until you approve its hook, and a plugin update voids that trust until re-approved.]

Codex1 Skill

By chock-coreLicense: Apache-2.00 GitHub starsUpdated 6 days ago

Directory evidence

Runtimes: Codex
Parsed components: 1 skill or MCP entry
Source updated: Sep 30, 2026
Manifest status: Canonical path parsed

The directory validates manifest shape and source location. It does not execute the plugin or provide a security endorsement. Review the indexing methodology →

Install guard-memory-writes for Codex

Installs for the current user

codex plugin marketplace add IchenDEV/agent-plugin-mkt
codex plugin marketplace upgrade agent-plugin-marketplace
codex plugin add guard-memory-writes@agent-plugin-marketplace

Paste and run these commands in a terminal with Codex. They add and refresh the PluginsMP catalog, then install this plugin.

Compatibility: the page URL and API slug “guard-memory-writes-2” remain stable.

Codex: guard-memory-writes-2@agent-plugin-marketplace → guard-memory-writes@agent-plugin-marketplace

The installer fetches third-party code from the source repository shown on this page. This directory validates manifest structure and source location, but does not perform a security audit; review the manifest, components, and source before installing.

Get the source manually

$ git clone https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock-codex-plugins

Clone the source repository, then follow its setup instructions to add the plugin to a compatible client. The plugin root is codex/guard-memory-writes/.

Plugin files

codex/guard-memory-writes/

├── .codex-plugin/plugin.json
└── skills/guard-memory-writes/SKILL.md

Included Skills1

guard-memory-writesskills/guard-memory-writes/SKILL.md

Plugin manifests1

codex/guard-memory-writes/.codex-plugin/plugin.json

{
  "name": "guard-memory-writes",
  "version": "0.0.4",
  "description": "Refuses agent-memory writes that hold what memory must never hold: pasted git history (diff headers, hunk headers, commit and index lines), a fenced code block longer than 20 lines, a line that duplicates another, and secrets (scan-secrets' pattern). Judges only memory files -- MEMORY.md at any depth, CLAUDE.local.md, .claude/memory/**, memory/**/*.md, and at agent tool-use the agent's own stores outside the repository (~/.claude/projects/*/memory/**, ~/.claude/CLAUDE.md, /memories/**) -- and only what the change adds. No waiver exists. Mechanised slice of memory-discipline's never_persist and chock-mise's never(store): secrets. Structural checks only. [Session-enforced via PreToolUse and Stop hooks; needs git and a Python 3.11+. PreToolUse judges the file a tool call would write; Stop re-reads what the turn actually left on disk, so a file written through a shell heredoc is judged too. With no working Python the hook exits 2; without git, fail-open clients allow silently. A gate that cannot reach a decision refuses rather than allowing one it never judged. Enforcement at every commit and in CI still needs chock installed in the repo. Codex requires a one-time trust review per hook -- the plugin is ADVISORY until you approve its hook, and a plugin update voids that trust until re-approved.]",
  "author": {
    "name": "chock-core"
  },
  "repository": "https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock-catalog",
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "keywords": [
    "chock",
    "policy-as-code",
    "hook",
    "block"
  ],
  "interface": {
    "displayName": "Guard Memory Writes",
    "shortDescription": "Refuses agent-memory writes that hold what memory must never hold: pasted git history (diff headers, hunk headers, commit and index lines), a fenced code block longer than 20 lines, a line that duplicates another, and secrets (scan-secrets' pattern).",
    "composerIcon": "./assets/icon.svg"
  },
  "skills": "./skills",
  "hooks": "./hooks/hooks.json"
}

Browse the “chock” tag →

agent-discipline

by chock-core

trigger: edits without reading, unverified completion claims, weakened tests, dead code. avoid: skipping verification, deleting assertions, leaving unused code.

Agent Plugins1 Skill

8Updated 3 days ago

block-destructive-commands

by chock-core

Best-effort guard against destructive commands, read as parsed commands (bash -c and cd chains included, echo excluded): rm -rf on absolute, home ($HOME/~) or root-adjacent paths (and PowerShell Remove-Item -Recurse); git push --force (not --force-with-lease), reset --hard, clean -f; kubectl delete; terraform destroy; aws s3 rm --recursive / rb --force; dropdb; helm uninstall/delete; docker volume rm/prune and system prune; gcloud ... delete; find -delete / -exec rm; shred; truncate; wipefs -a. git branch -D asks first. Verbs are matched position-aware, so a bucket or object NAMED like a verb is allowed, and a relative path in the working tree stays allowed. sudo, doas and pkexec are transparent. A pre-push hook refuses any non-fast-forward push -- force, +refspec or lease alike; a human escapes with git push --no-verify. Known bypasses: aliases, an unusual value-flag, interpreters and scripts. Friction, not a security boundary.

Agent Plugins1 Skill

8Updated 3 days ago

block-invisible-unicode

by chock-core

The mechanizable slice of prompt-injection defense, enforced at two points: at commit (the git hook, over staged changes) and at agent tool-use (over a tool call's arguments, as the agent writes) -- invisible and direction-override Unicode. Bidi controls make code read differently than it parses (Trojan Source, CVE-2021-42574); Unicode tag-block characters smuggle instructions that are invisible to a human reviewer but fully legible to the agent reading the file. Zero-width joiners and bidi marks (ZWJ/ZWNJ/LRM/RLM) are deliberately NOT matched -- they are legitimate in emoji sequences and in Persian, Arabic and Indic text -- so ordinary internationalised content passes; only the override/embed/isolate controls and the tag block, which have no honest use in a source tree, are blocked. Escape: 'pragma: allowlist invisible-unicode' on the same line.

Agent Plugins1 Skill

8Updated 3 days ago

For maintainers

If you maintain this plugin, link to this source-backed listing from your README so users can review its manifest and indexed components.

[guard-memory-writes on Agent Plugins Marketplace](https://pluginsmp.com/plugins/guard-memory-writes-2)

Directory evidence

Install guard-memory-writes for Codex

Plugin files

Included Skills1

Plugin manifests1

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For maintainers

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