block-unguarded-agent-spawn
v0.0.1Best-effort guard against an agent launching a coding agent with its safety checks off: claude --dangerously-skip-permissions or --permission-mode bypassPermissions, codex --full-auto, --yolo, --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox or --sandbox danger-full-access, gemini --yolo, -y or --approval-mode yolo, cursor-agent --force. A spawned agent that never asks and never sandboxes is an unsupervised agent (OWASP ASI10, rogue agents). Read as a parsed command, so `cd repo && claude ...`, `bash -c '...'`, sudo/env wrappers and `npx @openai/codex ...` are caught, while a normal invocation, `codex --sandbox workspace-write`, or a command that only mentions the flag (echo, grep, a commit message) is not. Known bypass classes include shell aliases, wrapper scripts, config files that set the mode, and agents this list does not name. Run the agent with its default approvals; a human decides when an unattended run is acceptable. [Session-enforced by the PreToolUse hook under com.github.copilot/ in clients that read that namespace (documented for VS Code agent mode); a client that ignores it, as the Agent Plugins spec tells generic clients to, gets the advisory skill only. The hook needs git, a usable bash and a Python 3.11+ (python3, python or py, whichever actually runs). With no working Python it exits 2; without git or bash, fail-open clients allow silently and fail-closed clients refuse matched commands. If the guard itself crashes or times out, the hook asks for confirmation rather than allowing silently -- VS Code agent mode honours that ask and it overrides the client's own auto-approve.]
By chock-coreLicense: Apache-2.02 GitHub starsUpdated 6 days ago
Directory evidence
- Runtimes
- Agent Plugins
- Parsed components
- 1 skill or MCP entry
- Source updated
- Sep 30, 2026
- Manifest status
- Canonical path parsed
The directory validates manifest shape and source location. It does not execute the plugin or provide a security endorsement. Review the indexing methodology →
Get the plugin
git clone https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock-copilot-pluginsClone the source repository, then follow its setup instructions to add the plugin to a compatible client. The plugin root is copilot/block-unguarded-agent-spawn/.
This listing currently publishes only the generic Agent Plugins format. Automatic install commands for other clients are not generated yet.
Plugin files
├── plugin.json└── skills/block-unguarded-agent-spawn/SKILL.md
Included Skills1
Best-effort guard against an agent launching a coding agent with its safety checks off: claude --dangerously-skip-permissions or --permission-mode bypassPermissions, codex --full-auto, --yolo, --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox or --sandbox danger-full-access, gemini --yolo, -y or --approval-mode yolo, cursor-agent --force. A spawned agent that never asks and never sandboxes is an unsupervised agent (OWASP ASI10, rogue agents). Read as a parsed command, so `cd repo && claude ...`, `bash -c '...'`, sudo/env wrappers and `npx @openai/codex ...` are caught, while a normal invocation, `codex --sandbox workspace-write`, or a command that only mentions the flag (echo, grep, a commit message) is not. Known bypass classes include shell aliases, wrapper scripts, config files that set the mode, and agents this list does not name. Run the agent with its default approvals; a human decides when an unattended run is acceptable.
Plugin manifests1
{
"$schema": "https://agent-plugins.org/schemas/1.0.0/plugin.schema.json",
"name": "block-unguarded-agent-spawn",
"version": "0.0.1",
"description": "Best-effort guard against an agent launching a coding agent with its safety checks off: claude --dangerously-skip-permissions or --permission-mode bypassPermissions, codex --full-auto, --yolo, --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox or --sandbox danger-full-access, gemini --yolo, -y or --approval-mode yolo, cursor-agent --force. A spawned agent that never asks and never sandboxes is an unsupervised agent (OWASP ASI10, rogue agents). Read as a parsed command, so `cd repo && claude ...`, `bash -c '...'`, sudo/env wrappers and `npx @openai/codex ...` are caught, while a normal invocation, `codex --sandbox workspace-write`, or a command that only mentions the flag (echo, grep, a commit message) is not. Known bypass classes include shell aliases, wrapper scripts, config files that set the mode, and agents this list does not name. Run the agent with its default approvals; a human decides when an unattended run is acceptable. [Session-enforced by the PreToolUse hook under com.github.copilot/ in clients that read that namespace (documented for VS Code agent mode); a client that ignores it, as the Agent Plugins spec tells generic clients to, gets the advisory skill only. The hook needs git, a usable bash and a Python 3.11+ (python3, python or py, whichever actually runs). With no working Python it exits 2; without git or bash, fail-open clients allow silently and fail-closed clients refuse matched commands. If the guard itself crashes or times out, the hook asks for confirmation rather than allowing silently -- VS Code agent mode honours that ask and it overrides the client's own auto-approve.]",
"author": {
"name": "chock-core"
},
"repository": "https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock-catalog",
"license": "Apache-2.0",
"keywords": [
"chock",
"policy-as-code",
"rule",
"advise",
"{'control': 'asi10', 'coverage': 'partial', 'note': 'refuses launching a sub-agent with approvals or sandbox switched off from the shell; agent inventory, expiry, monitoring and a kill switch stay with the advisory owasp-asi10-rogue-agents policy'}"
],
"extensions": {
"io.github.open-coder-ai": {
"artifact": "rule",
"enforcement": "advise",
"hooks": "com.github.copilot/hooks/hooks.json"
}
}
}For maintainers
If you maintain this plugin, link to this source-backed listing from your README so users can review its manifest and indexed components.
[block-unguarded-agent-spawn on Agent Plugins Marketplace](https://pluginsmp.com/plugins/block-unguarded-agent-spawn-5)