block-curl-pipe-sh

v0.0.3

Best-effort guard against piping a network download straight into a shell or script interpreter: curl|wget|iwr ... | sh/bash/zsh/python/perl/ruby/node (bare, path-qualified, or QUOTED ("sh", 'bash'), including subshell groups and transparent wrappers -- sudo/exec/command/env/xargs/nohup/timeout/nice/stdbuf/ionice/setsid -- in front of it, bash -c "$(curl ...)", bash <(curl ...), and the PowerShell iwr ... | iex form. Downloading to a file, or piping a fetch into a non-interpreter tool (jq, tar, grep), stays allowed. Known bypass classes include aliases, variable indirection, base64/obfuscated payloads, env-var-prefixed interpreters, and non-standard fetch clients. This is friction, not a security boundary. [Session-enforced in Codex by a PreToolUse hook: a matched command is denied before it runs (witnessed blocking on Codex Desktop, Windows, 2026-08-24; the deny is returned as hook JSON, not an exit code, which Codex's Windows shell wrapper mangles). Codex requires a one-time trust review per hook -- the plugin is ADVISORY until you approve its hook, and a plugin update voids that trust until re-approved. The hook needs git and a Python 3.11+ (python3, python or py) on PATH; with no working Python it exits 2 rather than allowing, and any other failure of the HOOK (missing git, a timeout, an unexpected exit) fails OPEN. A failure of the GUARD it runs is a DENY here, because Codex rejects the confirmation prompt the other clients get. Repo-wide enforcement at commit time and in CI still needs `chock sync`.]

Codex1 Skill

By chock-coreLicense: Apache-2.00 GitHub starsUpdated 6 days ago

Directory evidence

Runtimes: Codex
Parsed components: 1 skill or MCP entry
Source updated: Sep 30, 2026
Manifest status: Canonical path parsed

The directory validates manifest shape and source location. It does not execute the plugin or provide a security endorsement. Review the indexing methodology →

Install block-curl-pipe-sh for Codex

Installs for the current user

codex plugin marketplace add IchenDEV/agent-plugin-mkt
codex plugin marketplace upgrade agent-plugin-marketplace
codex plugin add block-curl-pipe-sh@agent-plugin-marketplace

Paste and run these commands in a terminal with Codex. They add and refresh the PluginsMP catalog, then install this plugin.

Compatibility: the page URL and API slug “block-curl-pipe-sh-3” remain stable.

Codex: block-curl-pipe-sh-3@agent-plugin-marketplace → block-curl-pipe-sh@agent-plugin-marketplace

The installer fetches third-party code from the source repository shown on this page. This directory validates manifest structure and source location, but does not perform a security audit; review the manifest, components, and source before installing.

Get the source manually

$ git clone https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock-codex-plugins

Clone the source repository, then follow its setup instructions to add the plugin to a compatible client. The plugin root is codex/block-curl-pipe-sh/.

Plugin files

codex/block-curl-pipe-sh/

├── .codex-plugin/plugin.json
└── skills/block-curl-pipe-sh/SKILL.md

Included Skills1

block-curl-pipe-shskills/block-curl-pipe-sh/SKILL.md

Plugin manifests1

codex/block-curl-pipe-sh/.codex-plugin/plugin.json

{
  "name": "block-curl-pipe-sh",
  "version": "0.0.3",
  "description": "Best-effort guard against piping a network download straight into a shell or script interpreter: curl|wget|iwr ... | sh/bash/zsh/python/perl/ruby/node (bare, path-qualified, or QUOTED (\"sh\", 'bash'), including subshell groups and transparent wrappers -- sudo/exec/command/env/xargs/nohup/timeout/nice/stdbuf/ionice/setsid -- in front of it, bash -c \"$(curl ...)\", bash <(curl ...), and the PowerShell iwr ... | iex form. Downloading to a file, or piping a fetch into a non-interpreter tool (jq, tar, grep), stays allowed. Known bypass classes include aliases, variable indirection, base64/obfuscated payloads, env-var-prefixed interpreters, and non-standard fetch clients. This is friction, not a security boundary. [Session-enforced in Codex by a PreToolUse hook: a matched command is denied before it runs (witnessed blocking on Codex Desktop, Windows, 2026-08-24; the deny is returned as hook JSON, not an exit code, which Codex's Windows shell wrapper mangles). Codex requires a one-time trust review per hook -- the plugin is ADVISORY until you approve its hook, and a plugin update voids that trust until re-approved. The hook needs git and a Python 3.11+ (python3, python or py) on PATH; with no working Python it exits 2 rather than allowing, and any other failure of the HOOK (missing git, a timeout, an unexpected exit) fails OPEN. A failure of the GUARD it runs is a DENY here, because Codex rejects the confirmation prompt the other clients get. Repo-wide enforcement at commit time and in CI still needs `chock sync`.]",
  "author": {
    "name": "chock-core"
  },
  "repository": "https://github.com/open-coder-ai/chock",
  "license": "Apache-2.0",
  "keywords": [
    "chock",
    "policy-as-code",
    "rule",
    "advise",
    "asi02"
  ],
  "interface": {
    "displayName": "Block Curl-Pipe-Shell",
    "shortDescription": "Best-effort guard against piping a network download straight into a shell or script interpreter: curl|wget|iwr ...",
    "composerIcon": "./assets/icon.svg"
  },
  "skills": "./skills",
  "hooks": "./hooks/hooks.json"
}

Browse the “chock” tag →

agent-discipline

by chock-core

trigger: edits without reading, unverified completion claims, weakened tests, dead code. avoid: skipping verification, deleting assertions, leaving unused code.

Agent Plugins1 Skill

8Updated 3 days ago

block-destructive-commands

by chock-core

Best-effort guard against destructive commands, read as parsed commands (bash -c and cd chains included, echo excluded): rm -rf on absolute, home ($HOME/~) or root-adjacent paths (and PowerShell Remove-Item -Recurse); git push --force (not --force-with-lease), reset --hard, clean -f; kubectl delete; terraform destroy; aws s3 rm --recursive / rb --force; dropdb; helm uninstall/delete; docker volume rm/prune and system prune; gcloud ... delete; find -delete / -exec rm; shred; truncate; wipefs -a. git branch -D asks first. Verbs are matched position-aware, so a bucket or object NAMED like a verb is allowed, and a relative path in the working tree stays allowed. sudo, doas and pkexec are transparent. A pre-push hook refuses any non-fast-forward push -- force, +refspec or lease alike; a human escapes with git push --no-verify. Known bypasses: aliases, an unusual value-flag, interpreters and scripts. Friction, not a security boundary.

Agent Plugins1 Skill

8Updated 3 days ago

block-invisible-unicode

by chock-core

The mechanizable slice of prompt-injection defense, enforced at two points: at commit (the git hook, over staged changes) and at agent tool-use (over a tool call's arguments, as the agent writes) -- invisible and direction-override Unicode. Bidi controls make code read differently than it parses (Trojan Source, CVE-2021-42574); Unicode tag-block characters smuggle instructions that are invisible to a human reviewer but fully legible to the agent reading the file. Zero-width joiners and bidi marks (ZWJ/ZWNJ/LRM/RLM) are deliberately NOT matched -- they are legitimate in emoji sequences and in Persian, Arabic and Indic text -- so ordinary internationalised content passes; only the override/embed/isolate controls and the tag block, which have no honest use in a source tree, are blocked. Escape: 'pragma: allowlist invisible-unicode' on the same line.

Agent Plugins1 Skill

8Updated 3 days ago

For maintainers

If you maintain this plugin, link to this source-backed listing from your README so users can review its manifest and indexed components.

[block-curl-pipe-sh on Agent Plugins Marketplace](https://pluginsmp.com/plugins/block-curl-pipe-sh-3)

Directory evidence

Install block-curl-pipe-sh for Codex

Plugin files

Included Skills1

Plugin manifests1

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For maintainers

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