open-coder-ai

by chock-core

rtk#1007. Destructive verdicts come from the chock_destructive table shared with block- destructive-commands: the same blocks (root/home deletes, force/delete/mirror pushes, reset --hard, clean -f, IaC destroy, cloud deletes, DB drops, lockouts) and asks (rm -rf off rtk's safe list, bare lease, stash drop, prunes, -auto-approve). Own rows block credential-file reads (.env, keys, ~/.ssh) and echo or inline *_API_KEY/_SECRET/_TOKEN. Skips file rows in container exec.

by chock-core

Warns (observe) when a change adds text a reader cannot see, or a URL that carries data out, to Markdown, HTML, SVG, XML, Word, agent instruction files, docs and templates: instruction-like or long comments, CSS-hidden, white or 1pt text, hidden Word runs, URLs with secret words, long queries, placeholders or encoded parts, remote embeds, camo runs, HTML data URIs. Runs: commit, agent write, turn's end. Waiver: a person's marker comment line above. Friction, not a boundary.

by chock-core

Asks a person before a change adds injection text to an agent instruction file (AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, GEMINI.md, Cursor/Windsurf/Cline/Roo/Kiro rules, Copilot instructions and prompts, SKILL.md, agent commands): rule overrides, secrecy, auto-approve, hook or review bypass, fetch-and-run, remote instructions, role swaps, fake system tags, removed guardrails. Refuses secret exfiltration and encoded payloads. Added text only; English phrases; friction, not a boundary.

by chock-core

Friction, not a security boundary: flags files that are secrets by name or content -- private keys and key stores, Google service-account/OAuth JSON, kubeconfig users, AWS, npm, PyPI, netrc, git, pgpass, docker, Composer, NuGet, Maven credentials, tfstate/tfvars, non-template .env, framework secret files, browser stores. Warns only (observe). Misses: renamed binary stores other than PKCS#12/JKS/DER, unlisted secret names, values split or encoded.

by chock-core

Blocks credentials: vendor tokens (AWS, GitHub, GitLab, Slack, OpenAI, HF, ...), JWTs, private-key and PGP blocks, named key/token/secret/password values (JSON, YAML, env, HCL, code), URI creds, Authorization literals, CLI password flags; files by path (.env*, keys). Misses: split or encoded values, quoted values with spaces, unlisted names, reference- or placeholder-like values. Runs: commit, agent write, turn end. Pragma same line; agent: only if in HEAD; MCP gateway: never.

by chock-core

Blocks credentials: vendor tokens (AWS, GitHub, GitLab, Slack, OpenAI, HF, ...), JWTs, private-key and PGP blocks, named key/token/secret/password values (JSON, YAML, env, HCL, code), URI creds, Authorization literals, CLI password flags; files by path (.env*, keys). Misses: split or encoded values, quoted values with spaces, unlisted names, reference- or placeholder-like values. Runs: commit, agent write, turn end. Pragma same line; agent: only if in HEAD; MCP gateway: never.

by chock-core

Friction, not a security boundary: flags secrets scan-secrets misses -- high-entropy values (16-150 chars) by secret-like keys, GitHub/npm tokens with valid checksums, Stripe test keys, Slack/AWS key-id shapes, Luhn-valid cards. Warns only (observe). Misses: values split across lines, over 150 chars, cut by # or & when unquoted, under other key names, written like code (a.b(), ALL_CAPS, words, URLs, paths), wrapped in a call, parens or concatenation, in XML, or padded with control characters.

by chock-core

Asks a person before a change adds a scanner suppression: inline ignore markers (bandit, gosec, ruff S codes, Sonar, Semgrep, ESLint security, Checkov, tfsec, Trivy, KICS, hadolint, cfn_nag, zizmor, gitleaks, detect-secrets, CodeQL, Java/C#/Rust security allows), scanner ignore files and skip keys, a CI scan set to pass on failure. Only added lines; prose skipped. Runs: commit, agent write, turn's end; CI annotates. Line-local, friction not a boundary.

by chock-core

trigger: large command output, broad searches, re-reading unchanged files, front-loading references. avoid: wasting context window on low-signal content.

by chock-core

trigger: large command output, broad searches, re-reading unchanged files, front-loading references. avoid: wasting context window on low-signal content.

by chock-core

Repo-local policy (this repo only, never published): run the fast deterministic catalog checks at commit time -- registry labels, README counts, quoted console output, workflow-trigger safety -- so a mismatch fails in seconds under the committer's hands instead of minutes later in CI. Each of these caught a real error from CI on 2026-08-16. CI remains the authority: it re-runs the same tools on the pinned engine plus everything too slow for a hook (evals, transcripts, the staged adopter). Skips with a warning when python is absent, because the backstop is what makes that honest.

by chock-core

Allowlist gate for new dependencies; no registry lookup is made. Watches requirements.txt, pyproject.toml ([project] and poetry dependencies), package.json, go.mod; blocks an added name missing from .chock/dependency-allowlist.txt. Not read: -r/-e lines, requirements-dev.txt, poetry groups, [dependency-groups]. Opt-in: fill the allowlist, then `chock enable verify-dependency-exists`. Runs: commit, agent write (vs disk), turn's end (vs HEAD).

by chock-core

Allowlist gate for new dependencies; no registry lookup is made. Reads Python, Node, Rust, Ruby, PHP, JVM, .NET, Go, Elixir, Dart and Swift manifests (read, never run); blocks an added name missing from .chock/dependency-allowlist.txt and asks on a lockfile-only addition. Not read: computed lists, sources, some pattern-read forms (see docs), versions. Opt-in: seed the allowlist, run in rollout observe, then `chock enable verify-dependency-exists`. Runs: commit, agent write, turn's end.

by chock-core

Gates MCP servers by name+source vs an allowlist. Shell guard refuses a write to .mcp.json or `claude mcp add|add-json` unless every server is listed, plus add-from-claude-desktop and a write with no entry. Allowlist lives in the guard source; shell edits to it are refused, no marker bypass. Script gate (commit, tool use incl. turn's end) parses written MCP configs (.mcp.json, .cursor, .vscode, claude_desktop, .gemini, .codex): added/altered unlisted servers and unparseable configs refused.

by chock-core

Gates MCP servers against .chock/mcp-allowlist.json, empty by default (name, launcher with exact args, or url host). Shell guard refuses `<agent> mcp add` and shell writes of MCP configs or the allowlist unless listed. Script gate (commit, tool use, turn end) reads 13 client configs: a server off the list, or with other command, args or url host, refuses; unpinned or shell launchers, http, literal credentials, old versions only warn. Misses: aliases, scripts, gitignored files, other clients.